The Vulnerability of Price Stabilization Schemes to Speculative Attack
Stephen W. Salant Rand Corfioratzon This paper examines the effects of government attempts to stabilize the prices of comrnodities by use of buffer stocks. .Agricultural goods subject to supply uncertainty as well as depletable resources are considered. In each case, it is shown that the resulting rational expectations competitive equilibrium contains a speculative attack-a situation where the entire government stock is suddenly purchased by previously inactive speculators. The analysis is applied to the bistorical attempt to peg the gold price, which caused the attack of 1968. The insights gained and the methodology developed also apply to the xrarious international agreements to irnpose bans on commodity prices which have been proposed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
Commodity agreements of one kind and another have . . . over a half century of experience behind them, all of it a history of failure . . . faith [in them] rests either on ignorance of past history o r the obstinate belief that what went wrong last time was attributable to lack of will o r cleverness, or unwillingness to commit sufficient financial resources to the enterprise, but never to inherent difficulties that could be understood in terms of elementary economic analysis. [HARRY 19771 JOHNSON
I. Introduction
Previous attempts to stabilize the prices of commodities by purchases and sales from buffer stocks have ended in failure. In the past buffer " In Goreux's eval~atioti of bands (1958) , he assumes atvay private speculators altogether, although he stresses the desirabilit) of including them and "their reaction to the bufferarock intervention rule" in future \\.ark. Ttvo econometric stilclies include private speculators but fail to capture their reaction to the polic! regime facing them. In one study prepared jointly for the departnients of State, Treasury, and (;omrnerce by the Commodity Research Cnit (CRU) (1977) . an econometric model of the copper industry was estimated under the conventional (but erroneous) assumption that agents react only to current and lagged prices. Then-under the (false) assurnption that behavior would not be affected by the operation of the government buffer stock-a price forecast was generated. In man) of the simulations reported, the stockpile was exhausted during the lj-)ear simulation periocl and an upwardjump in price resulted. Such price paths are disequilibria and, as such, have no legitimac) as forecasts. No properly specified model w~) t~l d generate them. In another study, Schink and Sniith (1976) use the M'harton EFA model to evaluate how the tin market would have functioned with and without a commodity agreement-inlplicitl> assuming speculative behavior would not be affected by the change in regime. Both the CKU stud) and the article by Schink and Smith are typical of the kind of econometric policy evaluation which is the subject of L~~c a s ' s (1976) critique.
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omission since it has been speculators who have thwarted previous attempts at price stabilization. Some have argued in defense of these econometric policy evaluations that the particular models chosen for the analyses have demonstrated impressive forecasting records in the past. But such records are irrelevant to the ability of these models to forecast the consequences of a new policy that will almost surely change the buy-sell rules of speculators. L,ucas (1976) made an analogous point several years ago in his critique of the practice of using the econometric models then in existence to evaluate alternative macroeconomic policy proposals. He concluded that "comparisons of the effects of alternative policy rules using current macro-econometric models are invalid regardless of the performance of these models ozvr the sample period or in ex ante short-term forecasting" (p. 141; my emphasis).
This paper develops a methodology in which the consequences of buffer stock proposals can be evaluated properly. The approach is to examine the competitive equilibrium under rational expectations when the government adheres to a specified policy rule. For analytic simplicity, it is assumed that the price stabilization policy attempted by the government is a peg. This policy is shown under plausible assumptions to induce speculative attacks. However, the methodology developed and the insights gained both about speculative attacks and about one-sided bets against breaches of the ceiling price apply equally to policy regimes where ceiling and floor prices differ.4 Hence, the methodology developed can be used to analyze the various commodity agreements which have been proposed by UNCTAD. In Section 11, a pegging policy is introduced into the Hotelling model of pure depletion under certainty. The resulting equilibrium is shown to contain a speculative attack-a situation where previously inactive speculators suddenly purchase the remaining government stock. Speculative attacks are popularly regarded as the product of either irrationality or unfounded expectations about future prices. By proving that attacks must occur even ~vhen agents behave optimally and have rational expectations about future prices, it is sho~vn that psychological factors are not needed to explain their occurrence. An attack occurs when total stocks fall below an endogenously determined threshold-as they eventually must with a nonrene~vable resource because of continual depletion. An earlier version of this certainty case, discussed briefly in Salant and Henderson (1978) , has been adapted by Koromzay (1978) and Krugman (1979) subsequently 'A general computerized version of the model could be u~d first to analvze specific proposals (be they bands, pegs, ceilings, or floors) and later to forecast prices once a proposal is implemented. An excellent start on such a model has been developed independently by Gardner (1979) . The merit of the present analytical treatment is its insights into the properties of such a model.
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to explain attacks on fixed exchange rate regimes, by Flood and Garber (1981) to study the collapse of a banking system, by Garber (1981) to model runs on savings and loan institutions, and by Flood and Garber (1982) to study the sudden monetary contraction which would result if an attack terminated a government's attempt to monetize gold.
In Section 111, the rnodel is generalized to incorporate uncertainty. Random additions, interpreted as new harvests, are assumed to augment each period the remaining private stock of an agricultural good. It has been shown by Townsend (1977) under related circunlstances that the government cannot successfully peg the price forever by operating a buffer stock; but he did not go on to investigate the stochastic equilibrium ~vhich does result when such a futile policy is attempted. Such an analysis is conducted in Section 111, where a pegging policy is introduced into the standard agricultural carry-over model of Gustafson (1 958) , Samuelson (197 1), and Kohn (1978) . This model is a generalization of the Hotelling model of Section 11. As in Section 11, a speculative attack is shown to occur in equilibrium Ivhenever total stocks fall below an endogenous threshold. But now the possibility exists that random additions will keep the total stock above the threshold. T h e probability of this event depends on the type of policy pursued and its underlying parameters. If the policy is attempted pegging and the official price is set so low-that it induces more consumption than the mean harvest, then a speculative attack occurs with probability one." Indeed, the certainty case of Section 11 can be regarded as a degenerate example of this proposition where the harvest density collapses to a mass point at zero. A more revealing case is when the consumption induced by the official price just matches the expected harvest. Then, on uzjeruge, no depletion of the government stock ivill occur and it seems natural to think that the attack threshold will never be crossed-at least if the initial government stockpile is sufficiently large. This turns out to be true only if harvests do not fluctuate at all. Otherwise, an attack is virtually inevitable. Indeed, as M'enocur and Salant (1981) have established, such attacks almost surely recur infinitely often-regardless of the initial size of the government stockpile. Section IV discusses the econo~nic function of speculative attacks and concludes the paper.
'If the commodity is a pure depletable, any buffer stock used to enforce a ceiling on its price (e.g.. a band) will induce an attack. If the commodity can be replenished stochastically, the probability of an attack depends on the para~neters of the stabilization scheme. For example, if the band width i
. infinite (laissez-faire) no attack will occur; if its width is zero (pegging)-and if D ( P ) 3 E(H)-an attack will occur with probability one. For an) specific proposal a computerizecl version of the model would permit calculation of all probabilities of interest.
P R I C E S T A B I L I Z A T I O N S C H E M E S

Pure Depletion under Certainty
In this section, we introduce a government policy of price pegging into the standard Hotelling model of an exhaustible resource. Since this model contains neither randomness nor additions to stocks, it permits attention to be focused exclusively on the causes of speculative attacks.
A. Equzlzbrzum zn the Hotellzng ~Zlodel wzth No Gozler~z~n~nt Interuentzon
We begin by summarizing the simplest laissez-faire Hotelling model in discrete time."eaders unfamiliar with this model and ~vishing to see a rationalization of its assumptions within a general equilibrium framework are directed to Appendix A.
There are two types of agents: consumers and extractor-speculators. The aggregate behavior of consumers of the exhaustible resource is summarized by a demand curve that is time separable, stationary, dependent on the contemporaneous price of the resource and on no other prices, and independent of income. For simplicity, it is assumed that the demand curve intersects the vertical axis at some "choke price," P'. Denoting the demand curve by D i p , ) , we have:
Extractor-speculators are assumed to have perfect foresight, a finite initial stock of the resource, zero extraction costs, and zero costs of storage. Denote the exogenous stationary real rate of interest by j-, the price sequence which extractor-speculators take as given by {P,),their aggregate net sales (or purchases, if negative) by x,, and the stock remaining at t prior to net sales then by K,. Extractor-speculators are assumed to maximize their ~vealth: that is, maximize x -subject to where p = 1/(1 + r) and {P,)is given parametrically. In Section IIB, the forces which motivate a speculative attack are highlighted by provisionally assuming that speculation (purchases from the nlarket by " For a more complete exposition of this model, see secs. 2 and 3 of \Veinstein and Zeckhauser ( 1975).
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extractor-speculators for resale in the future) cannot occur. Hence, in that subsection only, we impose the constraint that x, 0 in the foregoing maximization problem.
Since the objective function of the extractor-speculators is linear in x,, sales will take place only in periods where the discounted price is highest. For the same reason, speculative purchases will take place only in those periods where the discounted price is lowest. In equilibrium, the price must increase in each period by no more than the rate of' interest. For suppose P,, > P,(1 + r) on some t. Then the extractor-speculators could make infinite profits by purchasing an infinite amount of the resource in period t , storing it, and then reselling it at t + 1. Since there exists only a finite amount of the resource, such behavior would create excess demand at t and could not occur in equilibrium. We now define and characterize more fully a laissezfaire, competitive equilibrium in the Hotelling model.
A competitive equilibrium is a price sequence {P,) and a net sales sequence {x,) such that no other net sales sequence can strictly increase the discounted wealth of the extractor-speculators at the given prices and such that { x~) satisfies the demand induced each period by the price sequence {P,}. Hotelling established that a unique competitive equilibrium exists under laissez-faire, which can be characterized as follows:
In equilibrium, the price of the resource rises at the real rate of interest from that unique level which induces the sun1 of the demands over time to equal the initial stock ( R ) .
B. Competztzue Equz1zb~-zum ulzth Gozlel-nment Peggng but wzth No Speculatzve Purchases
We now consider how the equilibrium would be displaced if the government intervened. Specifically, suppose the government attempted to peg the real price of the resource (call it "oil") by standing ready to purchase whatever oil is offered or to sell, if necessary, all its limited stock to maintain the official price relative to that of some storable background good.5 Denote by G, the government stock of oil at the beginning of period t, prior to government intervention in that pe-
' S e e model 2 of App. A.
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PRICE STABILIZATIOX SCHEMES riod. Then the government policy of attempting to peg the market price at the official rate P may be described as follows: If P, > P, G,+ = 0; if P, = p,G,+1 E [0, C]; and if P, < P, G,, = C, where C is the exogenous maximum stock of oil the government can hold due to physical or financial constraints. That is, if the market price ever exceeds the official level, it is because the buffer stock manager has run out of reserves to sell. If the market price ever drops below the official level, it is because the manager cannot acquire additional reserves. For simplicity, it is assumed (until the generalization in Sec. 111) that C is so large that the market price never falls below P. Finally, it is assumed that the government has no oil initially (GI = 0) but has a stock of background good large enough to buy the entire private reserve of oil (K)at the official price.
If the official price is set below the price which ~vould prevail under laissez-faire, the laissez-faire equilibrium will persist, since no one would sell oil to the government at a loss and the government by assumption has no initial stocks of oil to sell. If the official price is set above the laissez-faire price but below the choke price, the government will bid up the market to P by its purchases. But it cannot sustain this market price forever. Since reserves acquired by the government are finite, they cannot satisfy the demand induced by the official price forever-even if the government initially purchased every drop of oil on the planet.
The market incentives which trigger an attack can best be understood by considering initially the equilibrium price sequence which the government policy would induce in the absence of speculative purchases. That is, we provisionally require that x, 2 O and compute the competitive equilibrium with attempted price pegging. Since (by assumption) the government follows its policy rule, it would prevent the price from falling below the official level ( P )by purchasing at that rate of exchange all the oil which extractors offered and ~vould allow the price to rise above that level only if it ran out of reserves to sell. Since (by assumption) the extractors maximize the sum of discounted profits, they would sell their stock (K)at the highest discounted price (if the highest discounted price dccurred in different periods, there would be indifference as to the allocation of the stock among such periods). In equilibrium, the extractors must voluntarily sell oil to the government in the first period and, in the absence of speculation, directly to consumers after the buffer stock is exhausted. Thus, the equilibrium price path must consist of' two discontinuous pieces and can be constructed from the curves in figure 1 . The first piece of the path is horizontal at the official price.' The second, higher piece rises at the rate of interest from a level which has a present value equal to P until the choke price ( P C ) is reached. Given such a price path, extractors would be willing to sell either in the first period or between the time the price jumps u p and the time it reaches the choke price.
Define i as the last period before the upward jump. If i = 1, the price would initially be P but then would rise at the rate of interest. Since P is assumed to exceed the laissez-faire price, however, such a path would induce less cumulative demand than is required to exhaust the initial stock ( E ) .Hence, any equilibrium must have t 2 2. The larger t, the greater the cumulative demand which is induced by the resulting price path. If, for example, i is increased from k to k + 1, cumulative demand would increase by
By lengthening t sufficiently, we can construct a path which induces a cumulative demand of E. In this equilibrium, the price rvill jump up at t + 1." Trvo the iast, the market price equals P. In the final period of government sales, however, the stock sold at the official price may be smaller than D ( P )and hence the market price can exceed P (see n. 9).
" In continuous time, the jump occurs at i, where i solves the follo~ving: ~D ( P ) + I:=; D(PeIt)dt= R. In discrete time, i is the final period of go~ernrnent sales. In the light of n. 8, f is that integer 'ivhich solves the follo\ving equation:
for some I'; such that p(1 + r ) ' ' > P: 3 P.
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PRICE STABILIZATION SCHEMES cases might arise. In the first, p(1 + r)j < PC;in this case the price jumps to a level which induces positive demand. In the second, F(1+ 2 PC;in this case the price jumps to a level which induces zero demand. In the former case, extractors sell part of their reserves initially and retain the remainder for sale after the price jump. In the latter case, extractors sell all of their reserves initially. In either case, however, the price must jump up at t + 1 in any equilibrium.
C. Competzt?ve Equzlzbr~um u~zth Government Peggz~zg
Once Speculut~ve Purchusec A T P Penn~tted
It has been shown that the equilibrium price path in the absence of speculative purchases al~vays has an upward jump. We now consider how the equilibrium changes when such purchases are permitted. That is, Ive drop the nonnegativity constrairlt on x,. T h e old equilibrium price path would then give extractor-speculators an incentive to buy infinite amounts at the official price in the period before the jump (i) and to sell sometime afterward."' Given any amount to be acquired, the least costly acquisition strategy is to purchask in the last period before the jump-rather than more gradually-since gradual acquisition at the official price would result in unnecessary interest costs.
Infinite speculative purchases cannot occur in equilibrium. If they were attempted, they would cause the buffer stock to be depleted sooner; ho~vever, the corresponding subsequent sales rvould cause the second piece of the price path to begin at a lower level. Indeed, if speculators acquired a large enough stock, the upward jump in the price path would be eliminated altogether and no incentive for a larger acquisition would remain.' ' T h e absence of a price jump would induce extr-actors to sell their entire stock to the government in the first period. It will be shown that such a situation constitutes the new equilibrium.
'" In continuous time, any upward jump in the price path would induce speculators to make infinite demands the instant before the jump. In discrete time, an upward jump would create the same incentives provided B(1 + r) < P'. If, instead, the official price were set just under the choke price PC > 2 P'I(1 + r ) there would be no incentive for speculators to attack. We assume that P(1 + 7.) < P' and onlit consideration of the alternative case, which has no counterpart in continuous time. h parallel assumption is made in Sec. 111 (see n. 21 ).
In continuous time the market price e q~~a l s P until the attack occurs and then rises without any jump at the rate of interest. In discrete time, the market price can lie in the interval [P,P(l + r)) in the period of attack as a result of an integer problem arising from period analysis. Hence there would be no incentive to acquire stocks a period sooner. But those fortunate enough to buy from the go\ernnlent at the official price in the period of the attack would make an immediate gain proportional to their acquisitions. If speculators acquired some stock K in the attack, the price would (in accordance with the Hotelling principle [1931] ) immediately adjust to a level (pH) permitting absorption of K along a path rising over time at the rate of interest. The larger the stock to be absorbed, the lower the initial price on the second piece of the price path: P = PH(K), P;,(K) < 0. In the simple case under consideration, this function can be written implicitly as a single equation:
Let A denote the smallest government stock consistent with maintenance of the official price. In the period when the government stock first declines below A , speculators will suddenly buy the entire remaining government stockpile at p; A is referred to as the "attack threshold." Analytically, it is defined by PH(ii) = F; graphically, it is determined in figure 2.
It is easy to verify that the attack could occur neither earlier nor later. If the attack were to occur earlier, when the government stock exceeded A, speculators w.ould take a loss. For the market price in the period of the attack would then fall beneath P. Since it is not optimal for foresighted speculators to purchase in anticipation of a loss, an attack on a stock larger than A is a disequilibrium. Alternatively, suppose one period had elapsed wirh government reserves less than A before the attack occurred. Then the stocks acquired \vould be smaller than A -D ( P ) .But then the market price in the period of the PRICE STABILIZATION SCHEMES 1 1 attack would exceed P(1 + 1.) and in anticipation of that price there would have been infinite demand by speculators in the previous period at the official price.
In the equilibrium, the government maintains the official price prior to the attack. T o d o so, the government initially must purchase the offerings of extractors who sell their entire stock at the highest discounted price (the initial price)." 'The government must then sell to the rnarket at the rate D ( P ) .When the stock falls below A, speculators suddenly attack the remaining reserves; they then sell over time at prices rising ~vithout a jump from the official price by the rate of interest.'" This scenario is an equilibrium since (1) the actions of the extractor-speculators, consumers, and the buffer stock manager are compatible (~narkets clear); (2) the government is follo~vingits policy rule; and (3) the extractor-speculators cannot increase discounted profits at the given prices by alternative behavior.
We conclude this section by making two observations. First, this simple model predicts speculators ~villattack slviftly, ~vithno prior activity, and before consumers have depleted the government buffer stock. Such behavior, which is often regarded as bizarre, has been shown to be the entirely rational response to the nlarket incentives generated by the price-stabilization program. Second, introduction of the buffer stock program raises the initial price and therefore increases the wealth of the extractors relative to laissez-faire. In such a circumstance, it is not surprising that the program has its political adherents."
Generalization to Incorporate Stochastic Replenishment
A. Introduction
In the previous section, we introduced a government pegging policy into the simplest Hotelling model of an exhaustible resource. Since " That extractors sell their entire reserves initiall) is a consequence of the assurnption that marginal extraction costs are constant. Readers finciing the implication unrealistic should consider the case where marginal extraction costs are an increasing function of the rate of extraction. This case also generates a 5peculative attack but is not considered in the text because it is slightly more complicated.
l 3 T h e description in the text is correct in continuous tirne: i.e.. go\e~-nrnent reser~,es decline to A , the attack threshold defined by J k = , ,~( B r " ) h .
4. An attack then occurs and the market price at the instant of attack is P . In discrete tirne, a bothersome integer problem aris_es. As a result, the market price in the period of the attack can lie in the interval [P,P ( l + r)). Since this is an artifact of period anal)sis, Ite do not la11el this a price jump.
I' In reality, the gox9ernmentn~u s t first acquire the background good (financing) needed to swap for the oil. T h e claim in the text is true if norie of this I-rurden is imposed on the extractors. Otherwise, they too might lose e\en though their profits increase from sales of the resource. there are no additions to aggregate stocks in that model, the reserves of the government decline steadily-permitting attention to be focused on the incentives for speculative attacks which a reduced government stock creates.
With this preliminary understanding of the determinants of speculative attacks, we are ready to consider whether attacks persist in more complex environments. In particular, we examine the effects of a stabilization policy in the standard agricultural carry-over model analyzed extensively by Gustafson (1938) , Samuelson (1971) , Kohn (1978) , and many others. In this model, private carry-overs are augmented each period by a random exogenous harvest (H,) drawn independently from a stationary distribution. As in the Hotelling model, there are two kinds of private agents: consumers-whose demand depends only on the contemporaneous price-and producer-speculators-whose sequential decisions maximize their expected wealth. '4s in the Hotelling model of Section 11, costs of production and storage are assumed to be zero. The previous assumption of parametric price taking is generalized to uncertainty by assuming that producerspeculators take as given the current price and the future probability distributions of prices. In this uncertain environment, producerspeculators are assumed to maximize sequentially their current expectation of future discounted profits. Hence, the laissez-faire Hotelling model of the last section can be regarded as a degenerate case of this more general model where the stationary distribution of random harvests collapses to a mass point at zero.
The laissez-faire equilibrium to this model has been studied repeatedly. Our goal will instead be to deduce the properties of its equilibrium when the government intervenes in an attempt to stabilize the price of a commodity by purchases and sales from a buffer stock. In the text, only a policy of price pegging will be considered. However, as will be apparent, the approach can also be used to evaluate price bands.
In uncertainty models, it is convenient to express all endogenous variables as functions of the state of the system. In this model, the sizes of private and government stocks are the state variables. Since we are considering a stationary infinite-horizon model, the market price in any period can be expressed as a stationary function of the state variables, P(K, G), where K denotes the private stock at the beginning of the period (including the contemporaneous harvest) prior to private sales or purchases, and G denotes the government stock then prior to intervention.
It will be convenient to rewrite the definition of the policy of price pegging in terms of the government stocks ( R ) at the end of the PRICE STABILIZATION SCHEMES '3 period. Hence the government pegging policy can be expressed as follows:
We denote this correspondence, which characterizes the government policy, as R ( P ) .
The economy evolves according to the follo~ving system of stochastic difference equations:
The first equation indicates the market equilibrium price in period t for any given values of the state variables at the beginning of period t. The second indicates the initial values of the state variables. The third and fourth equations describe subsequent transitions in these state variables. Given P ( K , G ) , these equations describe the stochastic evolution of the economy.
The rub lies in characterizing P(K, G ) . Samuelson (1971) characterized the equilibrium price function in the laissez-faire case by first specifying a stochastic planning problem which is solved in the competitive equilibrium, then analyzing this optimization problem, and finally examining its associated shadow prices. Unfortunately, since there is no reason to think-in the presence of government intervention-that the market equilibrium maximizes anything we can prespecify, Samuelson's approach cannot readily be extended.
Our approach instead will be to analyze a set of restrictions on the price function which must hold if ( 1 ) markets clear in each period, ( 2 ) producer-speculators maximize at each stage their expected discounted profits, and (3) the government follows its intervention rule. Any price function satisfying these equilibrium conditions must solve the following functional conditions for each state of the system:
with complementary slackness. The term complementary slackness means that at least one of the two conditions must hold with equality. Since R (.) is defined by (1)- (3), the left-hand side of each inequality will depend only on P ( K , G ) .Any function which satisfies these complementary slackness conditions is said to be an equilibrium price function.
These conditions place restrictions on candidate price functions ~vhich must hold in any competitive equilibrium. Their economic meaning will now be clarified. The first condition indicates that private stocks at the beginning of any period less the combined amounts absorbed by private consumers and by the government must not be negative. That is, the carry-overs of producer-speculators must be nonnegative. In expressing actual private and government purchases in terms of each sector's d~siredpurchases (D [.] and R [.] -G ) ,we are assuming that the government is following its policy rule and that the current market clears.
The second functional condition indicates that the current price minus the current expectation of next period's discounted price must not be negative. If it were, a disequilibrium \vould result since speculators would then attempt to buy infinite stocks today with the intention of storing, selling next period, and making infinite expected profits. T h e assumption that producer-speculators have rational expectations is reflected in the fact that their current expectation of next period's discounted price is equal to the probability-weighted average of the values ivhich the actual equilibrium price function would take at each of the possible realizations of the state variables. The first variable-the private stock which will be available for marketing next period-is equal to the sum of inventories carried privately and the new harvest. T h e second variable is the government stock carried out of the current period and into the next period. In expressing this latter stock in terms of the exogenous R(.) correspondence, we are assuming that the government is following its policy rule.
Finally, the complementary slackness condition indicates that if speculators currently expect to take a loss by carrying inventories, they will carry none. And if they carry inventories, no loss is currently expected. These conditions must hold if producer-speculators maximize expected discounted profits.
It will be established in the next subsection that there exists only one solution to these conditions. Section I I C will then characterize the PRICE STABILIZATION SCHEMES '5 equilibrium given any state of the system, and Section IID will discuss the stochastic evolution of the economy in light of' the properties of P ( K , GI.
B . Determtnatzo~zof the Equzlzbrzum Przce Functzon
In this subsection, we will prove that only one price function solves the functional conditions discussed above. Moreover, we ~vill show how this price function can be constructed recursively. Since our goal is to focus on the econon~ics of the model without getting distracted by the mathematics-the inclusion of which is necessary to prove that a unique equilibrium exists and to characterize its properties-rve adopt the following approach. We first make five assertions, each of which can be verified by analysis of the functional conditions. Postponing such verification, we treat these assertions as assumptions. \Ye then show why these assumptions imply the existence of a unique solution to the functional conditions. Finally, we verify the validity of the assertions. This last demonstration is graphical and intuitive and occupies most of the subsection.
Consider the follo~ving functional conditions:
and
with complementary slackness, ~vhere D (.) and R (.) , respectively, are the consumer demand curve and government policy correspondence defined previously. i) Assume that, for each price function PI, (.; ) in some restricted class, these conditions can be solved for a unique function P I , _ Define T as the operator which maps any P,, (.; ) in this restricted domain to P,,-Then any fixed point of this mapping clearly solves the functional conditions (8)-(9) associated with the infinitehorizon competitive equilibrium. O u r strategy ~vill be to sholv-using contraction-mapping arguments-that only one fixed point exists to this mapping and hence only one solution to the functional conditions. Toward this end, we note the follorving additional assun~ptions:
ii) Assume T is an operator defined on the follo~ving domain: the set of continuous functions of two variables which are bounded be-
nonincreasing in each argument, and no less sensitive to the first than to the second argument. By "no less sensitive" is meant that for any function P(K, G) in the domain of T, if K' + Gf = K + G and Kf 3 K, then P(K1, G') 6 P(K, G).
iii) Assume T maps back into its domain. iv) Assume that if P(K, G) and P(K, G) are any two functions in the domain of T and P(K,G) 2 P(K, G) uniformly, then TP(K, G ) 3
Then it is easily shown that T is a contraction mapping of modulus p with respect to the sup norm.'%nd since its domain is a closed subspace of a complete metric space and hence is itself a complete metric space (Kelley 1935, p. 192) , the classical "principle of contraction mappings" (Kolmogorov and Fomin 1957, p. 43) implies that T has a unique fixed point and that this fixed point can be approximated by beginning with any function in the domain of T and applying T repeatedly. We therefore conclude that the five assumptions suffice to prove the existence of a unique equilibrium price function. We now verify that each of the five assunlptions is in fact an implication of the functional conditions (10)-(1 l ) ,which define T. T o begin, tve shotz. how P,,-, (. ; ) can be deduced from any PI, (.;) Blackwell (1965) proled a corresponding proposition for operators defined on a complete h e a r space. Since our operator is defined only on the closed subset defined in ii, it must be lerified that his argument that Tcontracts remains valid. Denote
.K=U.C*O We wish to show that iv and v jmply that 11 TP -T P /I c P /I P -P I/ for some P E [O, 1). For any pair of functions P ( K , G ) P ( K , G ) + (1 P -P 11 , uniformly. If each side of the inequality is jn the domain of T ,we can apply the operator to each side:
formly. Reversing the roles of I-' and P and repeating these steps, we obtain T P ( K , C ; This last equation defines the relation between P,,_ and R ~vhich must hold if the government is following its policy rule of price pegging. We portray this nonincreasing relation in figure 3 . The remainder of this subsection is organized as follo\vs. We rvill show that the complementary slackness conditions which define T (together with the definition of X) imply a second relationship between P,,-and R-for each (K, G ) and admissible starting function P,, (K, G). This second relationship differs from the first in three important respects. It is derived using P,,(K, G). It is sensitive to (K, G). And it is nondecreasing in R. This latter characteristic ensures that-for any (K, G)-the vertical component (PI,-of the point of intersection of the two curves (with P,, -I plotted against R ) will be unique. Moreover, as (K, G) is varied the second curve will shift and the unique vertical component (PI,-1) will change. In this way, P,,-,(K, G) is traced out.
As noted above, the second relationship between P, -and R depends on the starting function P,,(K, G). If an alternative admissible starting function were used, the derived function P,,-, ( K , G) would differ. The operator T is simply shorthand to represent the complicated procedure of deriving PI,-l(K, G ) from P,,(K, G). Once this procedure is understood, we conclude the subsection by verifying the validity of what we previously assumed about the operator T.
Given (K, G, R ) and any P,(K, G) in the domain of T, it is straightforward to compute X from the complementary slackness conditions. T h e left-hand side of (13) (3) is continuous and decreasing in X. T o solve the complementary slackness conditions given (K, G ,R), provisionally set X = K. If the left-hand side of (13) is nonnegative, the conditions are all simultaneously satisfied. If the left-hand side of (13) is negative for X = K, lower X until it equals the root of the left-hand side of (13).16 This is the alternative Tvay to satisfy the complementary slackness conditions sirnultaneous1;v. Since the difference of the functions is continuous and decreasing in X, there exists a unique solution to (12)- (14) for each (K, G , R). The determination of X is illustrated below in figure 4 .
T h e variable X has the following economic interpretation. It is the sales (purchases, if negative) which producer-speculators would undertake in aggregate if private and government stocks were initially (K, G), if the government retained R at the end of the period, and if the price function next period ivere P,, (.;) . The left-hand side of (13)-plotted in figure 4-is the discounted loss which each producer-speculator would rationally expect from carrying a unit of stock into the next period given (K, G, R, X) and P,,(.;). The complementary slackness conditions state that producer-speculators will carry no inventories (K -X = 0) if they expect a loss ( D ' -PEP,, > 0); and if they carry positive inventories (K -X > 0), no loss is expected ( D -' -PEP,, = 0). These conditions are therefore implications of profit maximization and market clearing. As figure 4 indicates, they imply a unique level of aggregate sales for each (K, G, R ) and P,, (.; ). An increase in K shifts u p the expected-loss curve in figure  4 . Hence, d~i d K I~,~ 1 if X = K, and X increases in K otherwise. An = increase in G will shift down the expected-loss curve. Hence dXldGlK,~ s 0 if X = K, and X decreases in G otherwise. Inspection of the formula for the expected loss reveals one property of particular significance. If G increases by some amount and K decreases by that same amount-so that their sun1 is unchanged-then X must decrease by that same amount. It can be verified by inspection of (13) that this new X \dl1 continue to satisfy the complementary slackness conditions; moreover, since the expected-loss function is decreasing '" By assumption, the left-hand side of (13) is negative at X = K . Tile existence of a unique root then follo\\.s from the fact that the left-hand side of (13)is positive at X = R -G and is continuous and decreasing for all X. Finally, since P,,(K, G ) is assumed to be nonincreasing in its second argument, an increase in R shifts up the expected-loss curve. Hence if X = K , dXldR(,,(; = 0 , and X increases in R otherwise. Indeed, our assumption that P,l (.; ) is "no less sensitive" to its second argument than to its first implies that 0 G d~l d R I~,~ This completes the 1.'' first step outlined above for deriving the nondecreasing relationship between P,t -and R .
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The second step is less involved. Since D(.) is invertible, rve can express P,-I in terms of (X, G , R ) :
substituting the speculative sales function derived in step one into this inverse demand curve, we can reexpress P,,-as a function of ( K ,G ,
For the moment, we continue to suppress the dependence of X ( K , G , R ) and n o w P , , -, on the li In the event that the derivative ofX(K. G. R ) does not exist sornexvhere. j2.e can express the corresponding property in terms of first differences. That is. if K ' = K + A for any h > 0 and X' = X + A + E then (13) and assumption ii that P(K, G )be "no less sensitive to its first argument than to its second" implv that figure 5 below, we plot this second relationship between P I , .1 and R , along with the first relationship from figure 3.
The vertical component (P,,-of their intersection point is unique since one curve is nonincreasing and the other nondecreasing. Thus, P,,-is the unique market price which must result if the government follows its policy rule, producer-speculators maximize expected profits forming their expectations from PI, (.;) , markets clear, and stocks at the beginning of the period are ( K , G ) .
As ( K ,G) is varied, the nondecreasing curve shifts and P,,-l ( K , G ) is traced out; P,, -l(K, G ) will be continuous and bounded between (0, PC]. Since X increases in K , an increase in K (with G held fixed) will shift the nondecreasing curve down for each R . Consequently, P , , ] ( K , G ) is nonincreasing in its first argument. If K decreases and G increases by the same amount-so that their sum is constant-then for fixed R, X will decrease by the same amount as K ( d x / d G l~.~+~; --1). Consequently, for any R , P,-would be unaffected: Hence P,,-'(K, G) is nonincreasing in each argument and equally sensitive to each argument. By "equally sensitive" is meant that if K t + G' = K + G and K' 3 K, then P,,-,(Kt, G') = P,,-](K, G).
We conclude this subsection by verif).ing the validity of each of our five assertions about T. \Ye have sho~vn that for ally starting function P,,(K, G) in the domain of T, a unique function P,,-'(K, G) is implied by the functional conditions (10)-(1 l ) , which define T. Furthermore, this image under T will be continuous, nonincreasing in either argument, bounded between (0. PC], and equally sensitive to its two ai-guments. Hence T rnaps back into its domain and assunlptions i-iii are verified.
It remains to verify assumptions iv and v. Suppose we had started with a function P,,(K, G), ~vhich was nolvhere smaller than P,,(K, G). That is, P,,(K, G) 3 P,,(K, G) for all (K, G). Then for any (K, G ,R ) the expected-loss function of figure 4 would have been no~vhere higher. Consequently, the speculative sales function derived from the alternative price function X(K, G, R ) lvould have been nowhere larger: X(K,
Hence, since the nondecreasing relationship bet~veen P,,-and R ~, o u l d be nowhere lower, P,, -I (K, G) 3 P,,-,(K, G) uniformly. This verifies iv.
Suppose, instead, we had started with the function P,,(K, G) = P,,(K, G ) + d , for some e > 0. Then for any (K, G, R ) the expectedloss function of figure 4 would have been shifted d o~v n by PC. Two situations might arise. If, for a particular (K, G, R ) , X(K, C ;
That is, if, for a given (K, C; , R), inventories were carried previously, then an increase of PC in the expected discounted price tomorrow would result in an equal increase in the current price. Hence, since the nondecreasing relationship between P,,-and R would be higher by p d , P,,-,(K, G) s P,,-'(K, G) + PC. Alternatively, if, for a particular (K, G, R), X(K, G, R ) = K, then X(K, G, R ) s K and
if, for a given (K, G, R), inventories were not previously carried, an increase of in the expected discounted price would raise the current price by no Inore than pi'. In this case too, P,,-'(K, G) s P,?-l(K,
M'e conclude, therefore, that a unique price function sol\res the equilibrium conditions of our model. Xloreover, a similar approach can be used to show that a unique price function exists for the case of a price band.18 In the next subsection, we study the properties of the equilibrium under price pegging for any state of the system.
C. Propertzer of the Equzlzbrzunl wzth Attempted Peggzng for Any State of the System
In this subsection, we study the key aspects of the equilibrium associated with each pair of stocks ( K , G). MTe first note that the market price and hence end-of-period government stock can be expressed as a function of the sum of private and government stocks ( K + G).
We study properties of each of these functions and discover, once again, an attack threshold. If the combined stock falls beneath this threshold, speculators purchase the entire government stock and the market price breaks through the ceiling. In the final subsection we rvill study the stochastic e~olution of the economy and the odds that such attacks occur and recur.
Recall that the existence of a unique equilibrium price function was established in Section IIIB. This price function is the fixed point of the mapping T. Since any image of T is equally sensitive to its two arguments and the equilibrium price function is the image (of itself) under T, P ( K , G ) must possess this property of equal sensitivity. Hence, we can express the equilibrium price as a nonincreasing function of a single variable-the sum of the private and government stocks. Denote this sum by 8. That is, 0 = K + G. Since the fixed point is equally sensitive to its two arguments, the speculative sales function
derived from it ( X [ K , G, R ] )has the property that (dldR)X(K, G , R ) I ~ , ~
= 1 for X ( K , G, R ) < K. That is, for any ( K , G ) . increases in R result in equal increases in X until X hits its maximum value ( K ) and can increase no further. This property of the speculative sales function in l8 If the government attempted to defend a real price band, ive could express its policy correspondence as follows:
where P,, and Pi denote the upper and lower limits of the band (P,, 3 Pi). If the limits are equal, the policy is identical to attempted pegging; if P,, = P' and Pi = 0, the policy is laissez-faire. It should be noted that this new government policy can be represented by a different, nonincreasing correspondence in P-K space (for a given G) and that profitmaximizing speculative behavior bvould give rise to the rnme nondecreasing curve for each (K, G) as with a peg (given the same price function next period). However, in the case of a band, the property of equal sensitivity is not inherited by successors in the sequence of price functions. Hence the infinite-horizon ecluilibriun~ price function cannot be expressed as a function of the sun1 of private and public stocks.
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turn affects the shape of the nondecreasing function in figure 5. For any (K, G) as R increases from zero, X increases at the same rate as R;
Thus;for any (K, C), as R increases, the function remains constant for some interval, kinks, and then increases thereafter. Along the increasing segment, X = K and P = D-'(0 -R). T h e increasing segment is therefore simply a laterally displaced mirror image of the inverse demand curve (for P > P ) . When R = 0, the increasing segment equals D 1 ( 0 ) = P'. Thus, whenever the equilibrium occurs on the horizontal portion of the kinked curve, X < K and speculators carry inventories; tvhenever it occurs on the increasing segment of the kinked curve, X = K and speculators carry zero inventories. T h e size of the combined stock (K + G = 0) underlying any particular kinked curve can he determined by noting where it intersects the horizontal line of height P'. Figure 6 depicts the family of these kinked curves and is derived from the equilibrium price function. Higher values of 0 are associated with lower curves. I have drawn the increasing segment of each kinked curve as linear for greater legibility but rnake no use of this characteristic.'"orne price functions in figure 6 emanate from the vertical axis with a horizontal slope and then are kinked, while others emanate with a positive slope and have no kinks. It can be shown in general that the locus of kinks rises to the left until it intersects the vertical axis, and that the price functions lvith higher vertical intercepts have no kinks." Figure 6 also contains the nonincreasing government policy correspondence of figure 3. '4s 0 increases from zero, the kinked curvewhich depends on 0-shifts down and its point of intersection with the government policy rule changes.
I record the derived information in the two panels of figure 7. In the first panel, I plot against 0 the vertical component of the points of intersection, P(0). I n the second panel, I plot against 0 the horizontal component of the points of intersection, R[P(O)]. These t~vo panels record the market price and end-of-period government stock associated in equilibrium with each 0. As can be seen in figure 6 , if' 0 = 0, P(0) = P' and R[P(0)] = 0. As 0 increases, P(0) declines and 10 In fact, the increasing segment will be linear if and only if the inverse demand curve is linear for P 2 B.
'' Each price function is kinked whereX = K and D '(X + ( ; -R ) = PEP( 
In the indeterminacy, X varies between Z -G and K; correspondingly, R varies between 0 and A -2. As 0 increases beyond A, P ( 0 ) = P. Since the increasing segment of the kinked curve intersects the policy rule, X = K in this range and no private stocks are carried. Since
Hence as 0 increases, R increases at the same rate and P ( 0 ) = P.
Eventually, R = C and can increase no further. At that point 0 = Z+
This information is depicted in the two panels of figure 7. treatment and arises in discrete analysis only if the official price is set very close to the choke price. 4 similar case arose in Section 11. As we did there, let us impose a weak assumption on the relationsflip ofthe official price to the choke price that ensures that this case cannot
The two curves in figure 7 describe many aspects of the equilibrium. As long as the combined stocks are neither too large nor too
" If the locus of kinks does not lie above P for
That is, the case we wish to rule out occurs only if the official price is set so high that-even if no private or government inventories were carried into the next period-there would still exist no incentive for a speculator to pay so high a price to acquire one unit of stocks. T o rule out this uninteresting case. we must restrict the height of P so that P < P E P ( H ) .X stronger condition can he stated in terms of the = T -0. Since it is the image of the operator T , it will be equally sensitive to its t\vo arguments. Hence we call express the market price as a function of the sum, K + C ; = 0:
The stronger restriction referred to above is that P E P .~( H ) > p. y e will nolv show that if PEP,(H) > P, then P E P ( H ) > P. T o prove that P < PEP,y(H)implies that P <
PEP(H),we first show that P(0) 3 P.,,(0),where P.,.(0) = TO(0).Since Pv(H) > 0 and T ( . ) sat~sfies iv, T20(0)3 TO(0)or T'+'0 ( 0 )3 TJP(H) 3 T0(0), Hence, lim,,-,, T'O(0) P(0) a TO(@) -P, -(0). But if P ( 0 ) 3 P,.(0), PEP(H) 3 PEP,.(H) and the claim is establislled.
I n Sec. 11, the harvest was always zero and the restriction that P E P ( H ) > P reduces to PP' > P. This condition is discussed in n. 10. small ( A < 0 < Z+ C ) ,the government can peg the market price. But if 0 > Z + C , the government stockpile cannot be enlarged and the official price cannot be supported. Hence P < P. Alternatively, if 0 < A, the government cannot defend the ceiling ( P > P ) despite its liquidation of its entire stock of reserves. Note that as 0 crosses A from above, the end-of-period government stock drops precipitously. Since consumption is a continuous function ( D [ P ( 0 ) ] ) of 0 , this sudden reduction in government stocks has as its counterpart a sudden acquisition by producer-speculators. Hence, a speculative attack occurs when 0 drops below A. For this reason, we refer to A as the attack threshold.= Figure 6 depicts one other phenomenon of interest. As 0 is increased beyond Z+ C, the market price falls beneath P. At first the intersections of the relevant kinked curves and the policy rule occur in the increasing segment of the kinked curves.'"eyond some stock, denoted F in figure 6 , the intersections occur on the horizontal segment of the kinked curves.*%ence, for F > 0 > Z+ C speculators carry no stocks between periods. For 0 > F, however, they carry stocks. The behavior of speculators when F > 0 > Z + C is easily understood. For 0 in this region, the market price is only slightly below the official ceiling price. Thus, the government policy truncates capital gains but not capital losses. Under this circumstance, it is not profitable for speculators to carry stocks. If social stocks exceed F, however, the market price is depressed enough below the ceiling that the potential capital gains attract speculation. Similar properties are to be expected in models with price bands. Speculators will hold no stocks when the market price is slightly below a ceiling but will hold inventories when the market price is slightly above a floor. Such situations are often labeled "one-sided bets" against breaches of the ceiling.
Given P ( 0 ) , r\-e can compute the discounted expected price in the following period as a function of 0 :
Current and discounted expected price are plotted together in figure 8. For any 0, the discounted expected price either equals or is less than the "If the locus of kinks (XW)equals for R > C, the governmcent is nerer able to defend its ceiling and an attack occurs the moment 0 falls below Z + C. 23 In the case where the locus of kinks &\';M) equals P for some R > C, speculators would willingly hold stocks for nnj 0 > Z + C. In this case, the equilibrium price function has no horizontal segment, reflecting the complete inability of the government to defend theceiling. Speculators are willing to carry stocks even when the market price is just under P because they know the government will be unable to defend the ceiling and truncate their capital losses.
" Implicitly, F may be defined as that 0 rvhich solves the equation D -' ( 0 -C) = ~E P ( H+ c). current price. Whenever a capital loss is expected (e.g., rvhen A < 0 < F), speculators carry zero inventories (K -X = 0). Figure 8 can be used to clarify an important question. O n e mystery of speculative attacks is why there is never a Tang? of social stocks for which the government maintains the official price while speculators hold stocks. Why is there only one size of social stock w.hich induces this behavior?
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If, for some range of 0, speculators held stocks while the government maintained the official price, then the discounted expected price ~vould have to equal the official price over that range of 0. But as figure 9 illustrates,'' the expected discounted price function is strictly decreasing tvhen its height is P and is rlonincreasing throughout.
Hence only one size of social stock is consistent rvith private holding at the official price. A similar result holds for an): go1,ernrnent policy with a ceiling.
''The argument is made for M a discrete random \.ariable but can be extellded for cases where H is continuous. T h e term PEP(0 + Hcan be regarded as the I ) [ P ( Q ) J } discounted, weighted surn of functions of 0 . Each function is similar in shape to fig. i n but is horizontally displaced by H -[ D P ( 0 ) ] .Consequer~tly, each function strictly decreases when its \zalue differs from P and is constant (or nondifferentiable) when its value equals P . By assunlption, the mean disco~~nted price next period equals c.Accordingly, at least one function in the discounted weighted a\erage muSt exceed P and the disc_ounted mean price must thel-efore be strictl) decreasing in 0 when its \ d u e equals P. Reversing the argument, the discourlted expected price fungion can h a~e a zero derivative with respect to 0 only when the furlction has height PP. 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECOXOMY
D. Stochastic Evolution of 0
It has been shown that a unique limiting price function exists and that it exceeds or fills short of the official price depending on the magnitude of 0 . Three regions ma): be distinguished:
Transitions from one region to its neighbor have the following economic interpretation. If 0 crosses from region 2 to region 1, the government loses its entire stockpile in a sudden attack and can no longer prevent the market price from exceeding the official level. As long as 8 remains in region 1, all stocks carried bet~j.een periods are held by private speculators. When 0 crosses back into region 2, speculators expect inadequate gains and sell their stocks to the government at the official price. As long as 0 remains in region 2, all stocks carried between periods are held by the government. When 0 crosses from region 2 to region 3, the government is no longer able to purchase the additional grain necessary to support the nlarket price and it falls below the official level. As long as 0 remains in region 3, the government continues to carry its fill1 capacity. If additional stocks are carried they must be held by private speculators, When 0 crosses back into region 2 , all stocks are once again carried by the government.
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T o complete the analysis, let us study the stochastic evolution of 0 according to the following first-order Markov process:
Various events of economic interest depend on 0 and it is sometimes possible (even without Monte Carlo simulation) to compute the probabilities that events of particular interest occur. T o illustrate, we will investigate the probability that 0 eventually declines below A regardless of the initial size of the private plus government stocks and also the probability that this event will recur "frequently." We will assume that the official price is set to induce consumption equal to the expected harvest (~[ p ] = E [ H ] ) .Consider the stochastic difference equation above. If it were true that P(0) = P for all 0, 0 would execute an ordinary, additive random walk with zero drift. In fact, although
, the function is decreasing elsewhere.
When stocks exceed Z + C, the price falls-stimulating additional consumption; when stocks fall below A, the price rises-rationing consumption. Hence the stochastic process under consideration is a variant of the much-studied classical random walk2%nd can be analyzed by using well-knorvn results. A typical realization of 0, is represented graphically in figure 9 . The question of whether an attack must occur is equivalent to the question of whether 0 must eventually drop below the attack threshold. The question of its recurrence is equivalent to whether with "virtual certainty" 0 drops below the attack threshold more than any finite number of times.
The claim that a speculative attack is virtu all^ inevitable rests on the standard theorem in random walk theory popularized in the proposition that playing a fair game against an opponent with infinite wealth "assures" ruin. That is, in n rounds of play, various distinct ordered sequences of events (rvins and losses) might occur. Each sequence of length ?z has a probability attached to it. The sum of the probabilities of events (sequences) which imply ruin (zero wealth) approaches one for large n. Little need be changed to apply this theorem to our modified random walk. Assunie for the moment that the disturbance term (H, -D[P(0,)]) conformed exactly to the conventional random walk as-'" By a classical random walk is meant any p~-ocess of the form X I + , = X I + p, where & is i.i.d.; can be either a discrete or a continuous random variable. The extension of the usual theorems for discrete states t o the case of continuous state5 is due to the work of Chung and Fuchs (1951). sumption (zero mean, i.i.d.) . Then 0 cvould hit zero with probability one-and would, a fortiori, also hit the attack threshold. More precisely, for any n , some sequences of n harvests would cause the stock to drop below the attack threshold and some would not, but the probability of generating sequences in the former class can be made arbitrarily close to one by suitable choice of n . For any n , consider the set of sequences of harvests which would cause 0 to cross the attack threshold. ,411 such sequences would still generate attacks if proper account is now taken of the fact that-when combined stocks exceed Z+ C-the additive disturbance term should in fact be smaller than c~assupposed when the additional induced demand Ivas neglected. Indeed, some sequences of harvests which did not result in a crossing of the threshold when the additional component of demand was ignored would result in an attack ~vhen proper account of it is taken. Hence, for any n, the probability of an attack is at least as great in the case of our modified random walk as in the conventional case. This proves that if the official price induces demand equal to (or exceeding) the expected harvest, the buffer stock manager will almost surely experience a speculative attack. As for the possibility of repeated attacks, Wenocur and Salant (1981) extend the recurrence property of the discrete-time, continuous-state, classical random walk with zero drift to the case of our modified random walk. They demonstrate that if the demand induced by the official price exactly matches the expected harvest, the buffer stock manager can look forward with virtual certainty to an infinite number of subsequent attacks.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered situations where the government is unable to use a buffer stock to stabilize a price forever. Its futile attempts to do so result either in upward price jumps if speculators are absent or in speculative attacks if speculators are present. The economic function of such attacks deserves emphasis. An attack prevents the occurrence of dislocations which result from sudden cutbacks in consumption. Such cutbacks accompany upward jumps in price.
One general consequence of competitive speculation is the elimination of all upward price jumps which can be f o r e~e e n . '~ When the government stocks cross a threshold beyond which a future price jump would be expected, the prospective jump is avoided by the swift "transfer" of stocks of the commodity that has become scarce from the hands of the buffer stock manager, who would continue to sell the "1x1 this sense at least, speculators do stabilize prices.
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3 1 remaining reserves at the lorv official price, to speculators who will sell them at market prices which reflect economic scarcity. The attack is instantaneous because of the linearity of the government sales rule and the fact that speculators in aggregate can make rapid acquisitions at a constant per unit cost.
Whether such attacks actually occur under the circunistances specified in this paper is an empirical matter \vhich no amount of theorizing can resolve. T h e predictions of the paper follow logically from the assumptions. Readers who doubt the validity o f t h e assumptions concerning optimal behavior or rational expectations may question the validity of the theoretical predictions. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that although these assumptions have been shown to be sufficient to generate the conclusions, there has been no contention that they are necessary. On the contrary, similar conclusions may well follow from more "realistic" assumptions.
Like any other, this theory should be judged by the accuracy of its predictions. Fortunately, experiments have been designed and executed (Miller, Plott, and Smith 1977) that strongly support the predictions of the theory of intertemporal competitive speculation in the absence of government intervention. T o extend these laboratory experiments to situations involving attempted pegging seems straightforward. Such an extension would permit a replicable test of the theory.
If the theory predicts ~vell, a computerized version of the modelgeneralized to permit analysis of ceilings, floors, and bands-could be used to forecast the consequences of each of the many proposed buffer stock schemes.
Appendix A On General Equilibrium Interpretations of the Hotelling Model
The purpose of this Appendix is to reassure readers unfamiliar with the Hotelling model that there do exist at least two general equilibrium models which give rise to the special interest rate and demand curve assumptions of the Hotelling model of Sections I1 and 111.
Since the first model is described at length in the literature on exhaustible resources (Dasgupta and Heal 1979) ,it is mentioned only briefly. The second model, alluded to in several articles by Samuelson among others, is described in more detail.
In model 1, a single output is prodrtced using the resource as an input. Production requires the contemporaneous depletion of the input. Both the resource and the produced output are storable. One unit of stored output is assumed to result in l/p units of' output in the next period, reflecting a constant marginal rate of transformation through roundabout production. Consumers rank time-dated bundles of consumption of the output using a quasi-concave utility indicator and select the most preferred bundle lvhich they can obtain at given prices. T o acquire this bundle, they must maximize the market value of sales from their resource endowment and stored output.
In this model, as long as output is stored, one unit of output today must exchange on the market for 1/P units of output tomorrow. Hence the output rate of interest is (lip) -
The "demand curve for the re-1, a c o n~t a n t . '~ source" is a derived demand for an input (that amount of input the marginal product of which equals the real factor price) and therefore depends on the price of the input relative to the contemporaneous price of the output. Hence the factor demand curve is independent of other prices, wealth, production in other ~e r i o d s .
and so forth.
In moiel 2, there is no production. where zt and J, are the consumption in period t of the two goods. We refer to Y as the "background good"; it is notable because consuming additional amounts of it in a period yields constant increases in utility. The marginal rate of substitution between Y in adjacent periods is therefore constant (lip). The consumer takes as given the price sequences for Z and for Y: {Pf}, { P ) } .
By transforming his endowments through storage and exchanges with the market, the consumer acquires his most preferred consumption bundle. His feasible set of consumption opportunities is defined as follo~vs:
2pi=/+ 2Pb, s w. easily ke shown that wealth maximization requires the cumulative sales of Z to equal K . What is referred to in the text as the equilibrium price path of the Hotelling niodel can be regarded as the sequence of relative prices (KIP:)that solves these conditions simultaneously. The foregoing model generalizes easily to uncertainty and exhibits the martingale property which underlies the functional conditions of Section 111. This is demonstrated in Samuelson (1971) and-in considerable detail-in Kohn (1978) . A more comprehensive discussion of restrictions on general equilibrium models which yield the martingale property can be found in 1,eRoy (1982) .
Appendix B Attack on Gold
Between 1934 and 1968, the United States pegged the nominal price of gold at $35 per ounce. Hence, the real price \aried ~nversel) with the price level. When speculators attacked in 1968, the government sahaged some of its buffer stock by closing the gold window. In the 1970s, it began to consider disposing of the portion retained.
For simplicity, we will assume that inflation proceeded each period at a constant rate (T)so that the official price of gold-in real terms-declined geometrically. Furthermore, we ~vill assume that speculators anticipated that the government would be unwilling to sell its entire stock (G,) in any period t to defend the official price but would instead initially retain G for subsequent disposition. We will suppose speculators anticipated that the portion retained would be auctioned at some unknown time interval ( i = 1, 2, . . .) after the rest of the government buffer stock was exhausted and that i was taken to be a geometrically distributed, integer-valued random variable with mean lla.
The government might not have behaved as the speculators anticipated. But simply because we must make some assuniption about the relation of the prior expectations of the speculators to the subsequent conduct of the government-and no alternative assumptions seem superior-we will assume that speculators' expectatior~s proved correct both about the amount of gold retained by the government and about the manner and stochastic timing of its subsequent d i~~o s i t i o n .~"
We begin once again by considering the equilibrium in the absence of speculative purchases. Inflation would have progressively eroded the real official price-stimulating hcreasing demand-until the government stocks eventually dwindled to G. ,4t that point, the government would have suspended its pegging operation, and the real price ~vould have soared high enough either to eliminate demand entirely or, alternatively, to provide enough incentive for foresighted extractors initially to have withheld some of their stocks from the government when the stockpile was first created in order to sell them after its exhaustion.
When speculative purchases are permitted, this price path ceases to be an equilibrium since it creates an incentive to purchase infinite stocks immediately before the upward jump in price. Such behavior would "tend" to shorten the duration of the pegging operation and reduce the market price which would prevail follolving its demise. In the new equilibrium, as soon as stocks fall below the attack threshold, speculators ~+zould purchase the remaining resources (G -G), the government would close its window on units, and there would be no upward jump in price.3'
The attack threshold ('4') may be determined as before by expressing the price immediately before and after the attack as functions of the go\,ernrnent stock (G) just prior to the attack and then finding that unique stock which equalizes the two prices.
Since the nominal price ( P , )is pegged in this case, the real official price (P,) prior to the attack is no longer constant as was its counterpart fig~ire2. '4s time elapses, the stock held by the government (G) falls from K and the real official price (P)falls from P,,. Hence the plot of against G (with time varied parametricallv) in figure 10 is an upward-sloping curve passing through the
point ( K ,P,,).'~'
As before, the market price immediately following the attack ( P S H ) is a decreasing function of whatever stocks are held privately then (6). But the "If., e.g., speculators anticipated that the gove~-nment ~vould retain less than the government actually did retain follo~ving the attack, an up\va~-d jump in the market price above the real official price would occur.
3 1 AS in the text, this assertion is accurate in continuous time but requires minor modification in discrete time because of an integer probleni. I f +epeculative attack occurs at t, the market price on that period lies in the interxal [PI. !',(I + r ) ) . market rice would also be affected bv two exogenous ~arameters-the amount ietained by the government (c)ind the pr;babilitY ber period that it would be auctioned ( a ) .Hence we denote PPUas follows: PrH = Psrr(K;c;a). In a previous paper, Salant and Henderson (1978, p. 634) showed how the initial price on an equilibrium path can be determined when there is a probability a that the government might auction G units of gold and speculators own a stock ( K )of any given size. Hence, the P y f ffunction above is a reduced form of the Salant-Henderson gold model, just as the P f f function of Section I1 is a reduced form of the Hotelling oil model. Following an attack in which the government retained of its reserves ( G ) , the private market would acquire G -c.In figure 10 , PsH(G -G ; G ; a ) is plotted as a function of G.
The function is continuous and decreasing. When G = c,P,$H= PC.
The two curves in figure 10 intersect at the noint (A'. P + ) . The first U coordinate indicates that the speculative attack occurs when the buffer stock declines below the attack threshold, A' (> G ) . .At that point, speculators attack, the government salvages for subsequent auction at an unknown date, and the price rises without a,jump along the trajectory described in detail in Salant and Henderson (1978, pp. 635-36) . Changes in government policy parameters alter the date ofthe speculative attack. A decrease in the rate of inflatioj causes the upward-sloping curve in figure 10 to flatten and pivot around ( K ,P,) so that a smaller stock is associated with each real official price." The point of intersection shifts to the left, "" Pick any level for the real value of the official price. Let / ( t ' ) denote the period in which that chosen level is reached if the nominal price is maintained at P,, and the inflation rate is T ( T I ' ) . If T ' < T , t' > t. Let G , (G;.) denote the remaining government stock when the official price has eroded to the specified le\el. In the text, i t is claimed that G, > G;,. This is equivalent to the claim that prior cumulative detnand will t)e higher in the case with the lo\\-er inflation rate. This follo\\s since (1) in each period before the official price reaches the specified level, demand would be greater in the case with the
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implying that the smaller the rate of inflation, the lolver the attack threshold. Since it takes longer at higher real prices for the stock to be reduced to any given level, lowering the rate of inflation must also delay the speculative attack.
In Salant and Henderson (1978, p. 637 ) increases in the probability of an expected auction ( a )are shown to depress the price. An increase in a would therefore shift the downward-sloping curve in figure 10 to the left so that the two curves intersected at a lower attack threshold. Hence, the shorter the expected interval between the date of the attack and the subsequent auction. the longer speculators would postpone the attack.
Finally, it can be shown that if a smaller portion of a given stock is in fact retained by the government for subsequent auction, the price will initially be lower: dP,5H/dcl,,c; = PSH.2-P S H , I> 0. Thus, if' speculators anticipate that less will be withheld, the do~vnward-sloping curve in figure 10 shifts to the left and the intersection occurs at a lolver attack threshold-irnpl)ing once again that the attack occurs later. Hence, if the government reduced the rate of inflation to zero and fostered the belief that the entire stockpile ~vould be committed to the defense of the official price, the attack would be delayed the longest. But this is the case studied in Section 11.
